NEW 2009 Control System Released

[eugenebrooks]

Authentication of each and every packet on the wireless network is far more important in this environment than the conventional notion of wireless network security.

Lets assume that the field control system, the robots, and the operator stations are all connected to each other by one ethernet cable and no outside influence is possible. This is the goal of conventional wireless network security.

You still want every packet from the field control system to be authenticated, so that the other nodes on the net can't spoof it. You also want every packet back and forth between your robot and your operator station to be authenticated so that another node on the net can't spoof this communication.

Going further, if robots on your alliance are going to communicate with each other, you what these packets to be authenticated so that spoofing can't happen, and every robot would have to use public key methods to do this so that it can publish the data required to authenticate packets coming from it.

If you are going to spend any effort on network security for the communication on the competition field, the best thing to do is assume that one of the nodes that you have allowed on the net will attempt a spoof. If you prevent that, you don't have to worry so much about what nodes get on the net.

Eugene

Originally Posted by artdutra04

If they want security, then why not just use WPA2 encryption [with certificates]?

For example, for general use at driver training, demonstrations, and possibly off-season events, either a public certificate can be used or they can just operate the robots over an unencrypted network. But at every event, a unique and time-sensitive certificate is loaded onto the controllers for WPA2 authentication.

After the competition, the time-sensitive certificate deactivates, and the team can return to using the robot on unencrypted networks.