If the current measures truly produce many false flags and, similar to TSA, fail to screen for true threats, and, in addition to the above, they cause great inconvenience and potential health concerns…I argue that there is room for improvement.
What about an engineering approach to this problem? Minimize the bad, expand the good:
- coordinate arrival time to avoid situations that produce crowds of ~1,000 people in the un-screened area (e.g., weapon concerns), regardless of whether it be indoors (e.g., added fire hazard) or outdoors (e.g., inclement weather hazard)
– e.g., designate team arrival times, perhaps via a lottery, distributed in advance, with open lines of communication to account for changes in circumstance
- train the screeners to be aware of what is normal and what is unusual at an FRC event – use this to inform the nature of the screening process
– e.g., a mentor in possession of a screwdriver should not be considered a threat
- estimate the number of attendees, the time required to screen each one in an appropriate manner, and the time available for screening, and use this to inform the amount of screening stations and/or the arrival times
- screen the (literal) tons of equipment wheeled in through the back doors, at least some of which is enclosed in opaque containers
– e.g., build a network of trust and chain of custody with adults on the teams to avoid needing to manually search every workbench/toolbox/container as it arrives at the venue
It looks like NC is actually doing some of these things, especially by having multiple lines and facilitating faster screening with the clear bags.